



Global Development Program: 
Transparency and Accountability (T/A) 
 
The goal of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation‟s Global Development Program is to 
improve the income and well-being of people living on less than $2 per day. The Program seeks to 
promote specific changes that will help reduce extreme poverty in a set of target countries. To 
achieve this goal, the Global Development Program will invest in three complementary drivers of 
economic growth: (1) Transparency and Accountability, (2) Agricultural Markets, and (3) Quality Education, 
in addition to supporting policy research and analysis in developing countries through the Think 
Tank Initiative. 
The Transparency and Accountability (T/A) component seeks 
effective public service provision in developing countries 
The goal of the T/A component is to ensure the effective provision 
of public services, particularly to people living on less than $2 per day. 
I. T/A ensures citizens have the 
information and oversight to hold 
governments accountable for the 
provision of basic services 
Public services are important to help 
poor people out of poverty 
Governments have a mandate to provide basic 
services—such as education, health care, and 
infrastructure—to their citizens.1 Access to these 
basic services is especially critical for the poor; for 
example, education and health directly translate into 
improved well-being and have been shown to 
increase income. 2  3 
However, public services can improve well-being only if they are delivered consistently and 
effectively. The poor suffer the most when services are of poor quality or are not delivered at all. 
Better T/A, including effective oversight and feedback mechanisms, is a key step to improved 
service delivery.  
Public services often make up a large percentage of government spending. For example in three 
sample countries—Uganda, Kenya, and Bangladesh—services make up over 50 percent of 
government spending. Education accounts for the largest share of public spending (primarily teacher 
salaries), averaging about 40 percent of these national budgets. Law and order, roads and works, and 




Poor people often receive a disproportionately small share of public spending and have limited 
access to basic services. In a sample of developing countries, the poorest quintile of the population 
received significantly less funding in several core services than did the richest quintile (Figure 1). In 
addition, “leakages” of funds and other 
inefficiencies seriously undermine the quality of 
public services. For example: 
 In Mexico, families living on less than $5 per 
day lose 18 percent of their income due to 
corruption in the form of bribes to obtain 
essential services.5 
 In Bangladesh, lack of oversight allows for a 74 
percent absenteeism rate among public health 
care doctors.6 
 In Nigeria, 93 percent of businesses must own 
backup power generators due to poor reliability 
of the public power supply, attributed to 
mismanagement and corruption in the public 
power supply corporation, not to a lack of know-
how or skill.7 
T/A is correlated with improved social and economic outcomes 
Given the waste and corruption cited above, it is not surprising that increased government 
accountability correlates with improved social outcomes. For example, increased accountability, as 
measured by improved control of corruption, is correlated with decreased infant mortality (Figure 
2).8 In a study conducted in the Philippines, decreased corruption in the education sector was shown 
to actually improve pass rates and test scores on the national exam by over 10 percent.9  
While transparent and accountable governance may 
directly improve the lives of the poor, it also 
increases the prospects for economic growth 
overall. Good governance is strongly associated with 
improved economic outcomes. In particular, lower 
rates of corruption correlate with both higher GDP 
per capita and a more competitive economy.10 
Good governance appears to amplify the positive 
impact of certain types of foreign aid. In countries 
that rank high on governance scores, aid has been 
shown to increase GDP growth rates by 
approximately 0.8 percent.11 In contrast, aid may 
actually have a negative impact on growth in low-
ranking countries. The business environment is also 
heavily influenced by government accountability: in 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 50 
percent of businesses report corruption as one of 





T/A can address points of failure in service delivery 
Points of failure can occur anywhere along the chain that links government revenues, budget 
allocations, expenditures, and ultimately service delivery to the public (Figure 3). These breakdown 
points are caused by inefficiencies and/or corruption in any of the following four stages of the 
budget process: 
Revenue collection. Government revenues 
originate from many sources and can be lost 
through many channels. For example, lack of 
transparency in the reporting of extractive industry 
revenue payments enables government officials to 
embezzle monies before they reach the budget; 
gross inefficiencies in the way donors allocate and 
distribute their aid undermine the impact of 
development assistance; and inefficiency and 
corruption in tax collection reduce the amount of 
funds going to public services.  
Budget allocation. Budget allocation often 
neglects the needs of the poor. Public officials may 
prioritize spending to relatively wealthy regions for 
political gain, or governments may allocate funding 
to social programs that simply do not work.  
Expenditure. Inefficiencies are often the result of 
bad spending decisions. Without effective 
procurement and competitive bidding procedures, 
public officials tend to purchase supplies at 
unreasonable prices and award contracts to 
ineffective service providers. Corruption can also 
result in leakages as resources are transferred from the central finance ministry to particular 
government agencies, or to state and local government officials.  
Service delivery. The actual delivery of services presents more opportunities for corruption, 
cronyism, and mismanagement. Service providers may run highly inefficient operations; workers 
may be poorly trained or, more likely, have few incentives to provide effective services; and staff 
absenteeism may be high. Without mechanisms for direct citizen feedback, these problems 
compound and persist indefinitely.  
This adds up to dramatic inefficiencies throughout the funding chain for service delivery. For 
example: 
 $4.22 billion in oil revenue lost in Angola from 1997 to 2002, which roughly equaled all 
spending on basic service needs of the population during the same time period.13 
 57 percent of funds intended for education “disappeared” in Tanzania from 2002 to 2003 
before reaching the intended schools.14 




II. T/A’s theory of change highlights two primary objectives 
The T/A component has two specific objectives that will help improve 
service delivery (Figure 4): 
1. Maximize country revenues to ensure that sufficient resources are available to fund public 
services. As discussed below, this work will focus on increasing revenue transparency and 
improving donor aid policies. 
2. Ensure effective public spending, especially for poor populations. The “public spending” 
process has three phases: budget allocation, expenditure of funds, and delivery of services. 
Grantmaking strategies will focus on improving budget transparency, tracking public spending, and 
evaluation of service delivery. 
Where necessary, the Program will support efforts to ensure basic access to information, since 








Maximize country revenues to ensure that sufficient resources are 
available to fund public services 
Developing countries receive a majority of their revenues from three sources: (1) extraction of 
natural resources, (2) foreign aid funding, and (3) domestic tax and tariff revenues. Although 
domestic taxes are a key source of revenue, tax policy tends to be highly political and difficult for 
outsiders to influence. Therefore, the T/A component will focus on the other two revenue flows: 
extractive industries and foreign aid. Both of these are well suited to philanthropic investment, 
because policy changes in a limited set of venues can affect many multinational companies and 
donor agencies. Furthermore, leaving aside China and India, half the world‟s poor live in countries 
that are dependent on natural resources or foreign aid. 
Extraction of natural resources, such as oil, mining, or gas, is a key source of revenue for about 
sixty developing or transition 
countries (Figure 5). Despite the 
immense resource wealth extracted 
every day from these countries, 
poverty is rampant. This 
phenomenon, commonly referred to 
as the “resource curse,” occurs when 
natural resources provide large 
influxes of independent government 
revenue. These funds can easily be 
misappropriated by corrupt officials, 
or they can simply be wasted by state 
institutions that are not accountable 
to taxpayers.  
Foreign aid funding exceeds 10 
percent of gross national income in 
half of the forty-six countries in sub-
Saharan Africa; in countries such as 
Uganda and Senegal, official 
development assistance (ODA) routinely exceeds half of government expenditures.16 Though our 
ultimate goal is to help jump-start local economies so that international aid is no longer necessary, 
development assistance will be a key source of funding for service delivery in poor countries in the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, it is critical to ensure that aid resources are being used effectively—
both to benefit the poor and to ensure that donors continue to give aid. 
As shown in the theory of change (Figure 4), T/A uses two mechanisms to maximize revenues for 
public services: improving revenue transparency and monitoring, and improving donor aid polices, 
both of which are detailed below. 
Improving revenue transparency and monitoring. There is an urgent need for greater 
transparency in how extractive industry and foreign aid revenue inflows are reported and monitored. 
To improve transparency, Hewlett T/A grantmaking supports efforts to, for example:  
 Improve international standards for extractive industry revenues. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) seeks to promote more accountability in resource-rich countries by 




gas, and mining industries. Thirty countries have committed to the principles of the EITI. With 
the Open Society Institute, the Hewlett Foundation helped create the Revenue Watch Institute 
(RWI) to work with the EITI Secretariat and resource-rich governments on EITI 
implementation.  
Another international mechanism with significant potential to influence the behavior of extractive 
industry companies worldwide is the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an 
independent organization dedicated to developing a single set of enforceable global accounting 
standards.17 RWI is working with the IASB Board to include transparency of extractive industry 
revenue payments in the next platform of IASB standards. 
 Improve data reporting standards for foreign aid donors. Given the large volume of 
international aid, there is a surprising lack of good data available to governments and NGOs in 
recipient countries for the purpose of tracking donor money. Without this information, it is 
impossible for citizens to hold their own governments accountable for how aid is being used—
and impossible for recipient governments to manage incoming aid flows effectively. 
The best existing database of donor information, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System provides outdated information, is difficult 
to search, and does not include information on actual transactions. The Hewlett T/A component 
will support efforts to improve aid reporting standards through work with the 
OECD/Development Assistance Committee and with advocacy groups committed to advancing 
this aid transparency agenda. 18 
 Strengthen international networks of revenue transparency organizations. By working with 
international networks and regranters for these two areas (resource revenues and foreign aid), the 
T/A component will work to strengthen local monitoring efforts in multiple countries. 
 Provide direct support to local watchdog groups and research organizations. In the 
Program‟s target countries, investments will directly support organizations that are demanding 
greater revenue transparency and holding their governments accountable for how these revenues 
are spent. 
Improving donor aid policies, especially those of 
the United States, to help maximize revenues for very 
poor countries. Significant inefficiencies in the 
delivery of foreign aid result in loss of funding 
available for public services (Figure 6). Although the 
United States gives a relatively small share of its 
GDP in foreign aid relative to other donors, it is the 
largest bilateral aid donor by total volume, 
representing nearly 40 percent of bilateral aid.19 
However, recipient country government officials 
characterize the United States as one of the least 
effective of all OECD donors. Due to this 
combination of high aid volume and poor quality aid, 
reform of U.S. development assistance could yield 
significant benefits for poor countries.  
Most experts agree that it would be extremely 




development assistance without overhauling the country‟s outdated foreign aid legislation. Last 
reauthorized in the 1980s, the Foreign Assistance Act is now more than 2,000 pages long and 
involves more than fifty separate government agencies. To address these problems, new legislation 
for development assistance would need to include the following provisions: 
 Better coordination of planning and budgeting across U.S. agencies. 
 Greater budget flexibility for USAID, particularly in the field. 
 The ability to provide “good performers” with direct budget support. 
 Elimination of “tied aid” (requiring the purchase of U.S. products and services). 
 Significant reduction of congressional earmarks. 
With this in mind, the T/A component has been laying the groundwork for significant reforms of 
U.S. foreign assistance to be introduced in 2009 and 2010. The next two years offer a critical 
window of opportunity to fix these problems, since the most opportune moment to introduce a 
comprehensive reform of U.S. foreign assistance will be early in the next presidential administration.  
Ensure effective public spending, especially for poor populations  
To ensure effective public spending, the Program will invest in the following three types of activities:  
 Strengthen budget transparency and analysis. These efforts help ensure that funds are being 
allocated appropriately and are applied to the needs of the poor. In some cases, this means 
finding creative ways to obtain and disseminate budget information in places where budget data 
are not made public. For example, Developing Initiatives for Social and Human Interactions 
(DISHA), an NGO in Gujarat, India, gets budget documents from opposition members of 
parliament on the day the budget is presented, simplifies and translates these documents, and 
then disseminates this information to parliamentarians, the media, and civil society almost 
overnight. By making its state‟s budget accessible to a broader group of stakeholders to use for 
advocacy, DISHA has secured increased government budget allocations for the state‟s poor 
tribal regions. In other cases, this will mean 
looking at a particular sector and analyzing 
budget allocations so advocates who care about 
these issues can use them. In South Africa, 
many advocacy groups benefit from the research 
carried out under Idasa‟s “Children‟s Budget” 
project, which analyzes the implications of 
government budgets for children. 
 Support expenditure tracking. This involves 
tracking funds from the point of allocation 
through disbursement to government agencies 
and down to service providers. For example, a 
1996 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey 
(PETS) in Uganda revealed that Ugandan 
schools were only receiving about 13 percent of 
the funds allocated to them by the central 
government. Outraged citizens and public 




campaign to publish school budgets in major newspapers and on notice boards at public 
schools. As a result, by 2001, 80 percent of allocated funds were reaching the schools. Results 
from PETS have documented similar leakages in several other countries including Zambia, 
Ghana, and Tanzania (Figure 7). 
To strengthen the role of watchdog groups like DISHA, the Program will work with global 
networks (such as the International Budget Partnership) to seed budget-monitoring activities in 
developing countries around the world. 
In target countries, the Program will also support a more ambitious set of coordinated T/A 
investments to ensure budget transparency and track public spending, including:  
 Advocacy for improved budget transparency  
 Analysis of budget allocations and dissemination of budget information that citizens can 
understand  
 Expenditure tracking by NGOs and watchdog groups 
 Training for the media to improve coverage of budgetary issues  
 Expand feedback and evaluation of service delivery. Even if funds make it to service 
providers, services may be provided poorly or the wrong services may be provided. To prevent 
this, it is critical to evaluate the results of social programs through the following feedback 
mechanisms: (1) direct feedback from citizens in the form of citizen scorecards or surveys, as 
well as studies that compare costs of services across districts; and (2) external evaluations that 
help determine if the government‟s social programs are having the desired impact in terms of 
outcomes that matter, like reducing malnutrition or improving learning. 
Impact evaluations (IEs) are particularly useful, as they demonstrate whether programs are 
actually having an impact and at what cost. This helps establish cost-efficiency comparisons that 
allow governments to allocate scarce resources to the greatest benefit of the poor. IEs also 
produce evidence that can create political pressure for maintaining successful programs or for 
making mid-course corrections when necessary.  
Launched in 1997 in Mexico, the Progresa 
program in Mexico provided conditional cash 
transfers to poor families if they complied with 
certain conditions.20 For example, the program 
provided nutrition supplements if the family 
regularly visited a health clinic and conditional 
cash payments if children stayed in school. An 
independent impact evaluation of Progresa 
showed dramatic improvements for program 
participants versus nonparticipants (Figure 8). 
Thanks to this clear evidence of the program‟s 
success, Progresa, now called Oportunidades, 
has been maintained and expanded through 
several administrations in Mexico, as well as 
replicated in other countries.21 
To increase the number of large-scale IEs of key social programs, the T/A component has 




with members including developing country governments, foundations, official donor agencies, 
and NGOs. 3IE will improve the implementation of impact evaluations and the use of the 
information for decisionmaking by: 
 Setting global standards for IE and commissioning demonstration evaluations  
 Comparing results globally across countries and sectors  
 Sharing results with public officials to inform the design of future programs 
The Program will also work in target countries to promote better feedback mechanisms by:  
 Supporting efforts to collect direct feedback from citizens on service delivery and to conduct 
surveys comparing service delivery performance and costs across districts 
 Encouraging government ministries to commission more independent IEs of public services 
and to make the results of these evaluations public 
Improve access to information where necessary to ensure effective 
oversight 
Certain enabling conditions must be in place for the investments described above to succeed. One 
of the most important conditions is ensuring access to information through freedom of information 
laws or similar mechanisms. If citizens cannot access basic information about the decisions the 
government is making, and how it is generating and allocating public funds, then it is extremely 
difficult to carry out most of the interventions proposed here (e.g., budget analysis or expenditure 
tracking). As in the case of Mexico (see Section IV), the T/A component supports work to improve 
access to information in countries where local partners find this agenda to be essential to effective 
oversight. 
III. To maximize impact, T/A will focus investments in target countries  
Investments at the country level will focus primarily on improved public spending in a select group 
of countries, likely to include some combination of Ghana, Kenya, Mexico Nigeria, Tanzania, and 
Uganda over the next ten years. As discussed above, these in-country T/A investments will focus on 
revenue and budget transparency, effective public spending, and improving the evaluation of service 
delivery. Example grantees include think tanks, local CSOs, government ministries, and training 
organizations like the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (MIT). 
With the help of T/A and country experts, the Program will assess the specific target countries to 
determine: (1) where the greatest sources of leakage or inefficiency are in the budget process; and (2) 
whether there are interested partner organizations that can help address these weaknesses. Country 
assessments will seek to answer the following questions (among others): 
 Revenue collection. What are the main sources of revenue in the country? Are there 
concentrated flows (e.g., from extractive industries or foreign aid) that could be better 
tracked? 
 Budget allocation. Is there sufficient budget transparency to analyze budget allocations and 
track expenditures? Is there a “citizens‟ budget” or some other way of translating the budget 
into language the average person can understand? Is the budget allocated in response to 




 Expenditure. Where are the key problems in the budget process, and where are the most 
leakages? Has a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey been conducted in the country, and if 
so, what did the results show? Are there particular sectors where corruption appears to be 
most prevalent? What is the role of the Auditor General? 
 Service delivery. What are the primary causes of poor services in the country? Does the 
government ever perform (or commission) high-quality impact evaluations of social 
programs? Are there groups with the capacity to conduct IEs? Are there mechanisms in 
place for citizen feedback on services? Have comparative cost surveys been conducted? 
IV. Recent investments in Mexico illustrate the potential impact of a 
country-level approach  
Democratization and effective grantmaking have helped increase 
transparency and accountability reforms in Mexico 
This section provides an overview of activities the 
Hewlett Global Development Program‟s T/A 
component has supported in Mexico, ongoing 
challenges that point to areas for future investment, 
and lessons that can be applied to the Program‟s 
T/A investments in other countries throughout the 
world. 
Poverty and corruption are both 
widespread in Mexico  
Current estimates of poverty in Mexico show that 
half of the country, over 50 million people, are 
poor and living on less than $5 per day, and that 20 
percent of the population is living in extreme 
poverty on less than $2 per day (Figure 9). 
Mexico‟s transition to multiparty democracy in 
2000 provided an opening to improve governance. 
Since then, Mexico has improved its scores on 
World Bank measures of government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, and control of corruption. But much more needs to be done to ensure that 
Mexico‟s democratic transition produces governance improvements that directly benefit the half of 
the Mexican population that lives below the poverty line.  
Mexico is still ten points below the average on measures of government accountability, and twenty-
one points below the average on control of corruption. Mexico is also falling behind other countries 




T/A investments in Mexico have helped locally driven efforts succeed 
at both the federal and state levels 
In 2004, Hewlett took advantage of the country‟s democratic opening to implement, expand, and 
strengthen transparency and accountability guarantees in Mexico to benefit the poor.  
Hewlett‟s strategy in Mexico has taken advantage of opportunities presented by the passage of 
Access to Information (ATI) legislation (sometimes called Freedom of Information legislation) and 
other transparency and accountability reforms, including laws to improve public budget transparency 
and performance, and a law requiring impact evaluations of all federal social development programs. 
These laws have created positive conditions for working on T/A as well as momentum to improve 
governance. Still, the challenge of implementing these remarkable transparency and accountability 
reforms remains (especially at the state and local levels), and is an important goal for the Global 
Development Program in Mexico. 
The Hewlett strategy in Mexico has been to solidify 
and expand transparency and accountability 
guarantees, expand the constituency working on 
T/A, and provide targeted technical assistance to 
the government for T/A reforms and 
implementation, especially at the state level. This 
involves working with a broad set of actors and 
practitioners -- NGOs, independent think tanks, 
universities, journalists, and government officials -- 
across sectors, including health, environment, 
human rights, the judicial system, and the private 
sector. The Foundation has invested in a variety of 
research and advocacy organizations to expand 
access to information guarantees and then to use 
newly available information on public spending to 
improve service delivery for the poor.  
After only five years of T/A grantmaking, the 
Foundation‟s work in Mexico has contributed to 
several successes. The Foundation‟s grants have 
built a diverse community of grantees working together on T/A, including bridging traditional 
barriers between CSOs and government. It was this community that played a key role in the 
following advances: 
 The passage of a constitutional amendment to guarantee access to federal, state, and municipal-
level information. 
 Completion of a major pilot project to understand how poor communities can use ATI to 
improve well-being (e.g., IFAI Comunidades). 
 Increased local media capacity to use ATI. 
 Emphasis on governance as an economic competitiveness issue. 




 Inclusion of „civic‟ organizations (including transparency and accountability watchdog groups) as 
eligible for tax-deductible status in Mexico. 
 Use of information technology tools to foster a network of national, state, and local 
organizations that focus on T/A in Mexico.  
 Passage of state-level budget accounting reform. 
 Publicly available, user-friendly information on Mexico‟s major agricultural subsidies. 
 
With the constitutional guarantee of access to information now in place, transparency laws have de 
jure expanded to all states and large municipalities in Mexico (Figure 10). De facto implementation 
challenges remain that require further effort and investment by Hewlett and other donors.  There is 
some evidence that improved transparency is allowing citizens at the state and local level to track 
service delivery from federal government budget coffers to intended poor recipients. However, we 
also see signs of resistance to new transparency and accountability reforms as citizens, especially at 
the state and local levels, are exercising these powerful new rights. Experts are now citing strategies 
used in Mexico to guide efforts to increase transparency and improve public spending in other 
countries around the world.  
Experts recommend shifting 
investments in Mexico to focus on 
decentralized spending  
Based on the current level of transparency and 
accountability in Mexico, experts recommend 
investments that focus primarily on public 
spending—including budget analysis and 
monitoring, expenditure tracking, and impact 
evaluation—with some additional work to improve 
access to information (Figure 11). By focusing on 
public spending, the Program‟s investments will 
seek to address some of the challenges associated 
with Mexico‟s recent decentralization of funding, 
which has shifted significant funding to the states 
over the past decade.  
This shift has resulted in many issues at the state level. First, the change occurred before 
mechanisms were put in place to hold states and municipal governments accountable for how they 
spent public funds. Second, even though the states receive funds, taxation and revenue generation 
remain concentrated at the federal level. As a result, “states are like kids in a candy store,” as one 
expert put it, with little accountability for their spending. Finally, CSO capacity remains limited at 
the sub-national level.  
To address these challenges, experts recommend more focus on investments that impact state and 
local activities: 
 Continue work to realize ATI guarantees 





 Conduct comparative analyses of state accounting, procurement and spending practices 
 Effectively use and expand impact evaluations 
Decisions about where to focus state and local investments will be based on criteria such as local 
NGO capacity, political opportunity (vis-à-vis state and local governments), and relative 
concentration of poor populations.  
Grantmaking in Mexico offers lessons for the Program’s future country-
level work  
Our successes and failures in Mexico suggest several lessons for T/A investments in new 
democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Local networks are critical. Isolated transparency and oversight groups will be more 
vulnerable to political vagaries. The Mexico Program team has built a diverse network of in-
country players who have helped influence policy change and are working to prevent 
backsliding.  
 T/A improvements should begin at the federal level, but extend quickly to sub-national 
levels in decentralized systems. Democratization in Mexico has created an unusually speedy 
laboratory for T/A reforms that are now extending to the states and municipalities. 
 Investments in transparency and accountability guarantees alone are not enough to 
secure benefits for the poor. Passing laws is only a first step -- implementing guarantees 
are the greater challenge. In addition, CSOs that work with the poor need direct support to 
take advantage of access to information guarantees in order to analyze budgets and track 
expenditures for the poor. Impact evaluation is also a critical tool for improving public spending 
at the country level. 
 Creative collaboration with government is essential. The Program has found creative ways 
of working with key Mexican government agencies and ministries. Simply increasing citizen 
oversight and monitoring of government is not sufficient without increasing government‟s 
capacity to respond constructively. Our experience has shown that securing the buy-in of 
institutions, not just individual government officials, is important over the long-term.  
 The fiscal and legal enabling environment matters for CSOs. Local watchdogs and other 
civil society advocates will benefit from an enabling environment infrastructure that fosters 
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